Abstract
As is well known, self-deception raises two main, seemingly unresolvable paradoxes. The first is as follows: if self-deception is intentional, it seems unlikely that a person could deceive herself while being fully aware of her intention, for awareness of the intention would interfere with the success of her project ('dynamic problem'). The second is: if self-deception is structurally similar to interpersonal deception, then it seems the self-deceiver must hold contradictory beliefs, which is difficult because believing that p rules out believing that not-p ('static problem'). The aim of this project is to resolve these issues by adopting a Kantian perspective, thereby contributing to both Kant scholarship and contemporary debates. Based on Kant's writings, my strategy is to distinguish two main forms of self-deception: epistemic and moral. While the former is unconscious and thus automatically successful, the latter involves a process of intentional rationalization against the laws of duty and can succeed only when one's understanding of moral principles is weak. In these cases, the rationalizer escapes both puzzles not because she holds contradictory beliefs, but because she replaces one belief with another by rationalizing—i.e., by using captious arguments that the same subject cannot counter due to insufficient comprehension of moral principles.
Researcher(s)
Research team(s)
Funding
Project type(s)